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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND 
THE ASSUMPTION OF EQUALITY 
Michael Evan Gold 
Cornell University 
ABSTRACT 
The assumption of equality undergirds the American law of employment discrimination. The 
assumption is that racial and sexual classes are equally qualified for jobs. Although it has sometimes 
been ignored, and can be rebutted in a specific case, the assumption of equality is fundamental to the 
law of nondiscrimination. Proof of discrimination in a class action, whether based on disparate treatment 
or disparate impact, requires the assumption. The assumption is so strong in this context that when the 
Supreme Court weakened it recently, Congress promptly reinforced it. The assumption of equality is also 
a crucial element of the law of affirmative action and reverse discrimination. The former is consistent 
with the assumption and is legal; the latter is inconsistent with the assumption and is illegal. By 
prohibiting race norming, which violates the assumption, Congress has reaffirmed its commitment to the 
assumption. 
INTRODUCTION 
The assumption of equality underlies and supports a great deal of American ideology. The 
assumption is that racial classes are equal and that, except for physical differences which are usually 
irrelevant, sexual classes are equal as well. The assumption appears in our fundamental documents. If 
school children know nothing else of the Declaration of Independence, they know it contains the ringing 
words, "We hold these truths to be self evident: that all men are created equal." Thomas Jefferson may 
have meant by equal that "each citizen is endowed with certain unalienable rights," but today these 
words have grown to mean that we are equal in other ways—for example, that across classes we are 
equal in our basic abilities and needs. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution 
guarantee to all persons "the equal protection of the laws." I believe these words also mean today that 
racial and sexual classes of people are equal. 
The assumption of equality nourishes our most important institutions. Public education is an 
example. If we assumed that one class was inferior to another, we would accept, and even demand, that 
the inferior class receive education "appropriate to its limitations;" instead (at least in principle) we 
insist on equal educational opportunities for all classes. The criminal justice system is another example. 
Without the assumption of equality, we would presume that a member of the inferior class was more 
likely to be guilty if accused of crime and was deserving of different (probably harsher) punishment if 
convicted. Political participation is a third example. A class thought to be inferior would not enjoy the 
same rights to vote and to hold office as the superior class. Our right to privacy is a fourth example. 
Without the assumption of equality, laws against the marriage of superior and inferior beings could be 
justified. 
Perhaps we have honored the assumption of equality as often in the breach as in the 
observance. In the past, women and people of color were denied education or relegated to second class 
schools, did not receive equal justice in court, and were forbidden to run for office or vote; and 
miscegenation was a crime. Today, we acknowledge the assumption in words, but not always in deeds. 
Education is better for white men than for people of color and perhaps than for women as well. A 
person of color is more likely to be arrested for and convicted of a crime. Most politicians are white 
men. Biracial couples are rarely welcomed into monoracial homes. 
Nonetheless, few of us believe that segregated schools, biased criminal proceedings, denial of 
political rights, and laws against intermarriage are just. I believe that the assumption of equality is 
stronger in America today than ever in the past. If we fall short of achieving the ideal, it remains worthy 
of our respect. To abandon it would be to deny a major part of this nation's raison d'etre. 
One may fairly ask whether the assumption of equality adds anything to the notion of the right 
to individual treatment. These ideas do lead to the same outcomes in some cases. In regard to criminal 
justice, for example, both individual treatment and the assumption of equality require that anyone, 
regardless of race or sex, be presumed innocent until proven guilty; and that, if one is found guilty, 
group characteristics like race or sex should not influence punishment. Nonetheless, the assumption of 
equality has independent vitality for two reasons. First, we often think in terms of groups instead of 
individuals. Thus, the media may report that "women" object to the way that a character is portrayed in 
a fi lm or that a candidate for office is courting the "Jewish" vote. To the extent that we think and act on 
a group basis, individual treatment is irrelevant and the assumption of equality is crucial. Second (or, 
perhaps, a further example of the first reason), the assumption of equality operates in cases in which 
individual treatment does not. Education is an example. Suppose that a school district provided better 
school facilities in white neighborhoods than in African-American and Latino-American neighborhoods. 
If students were free to attend any school in the district, individual treatment might be satisfied; but the 
assumption of equality would be violated because the district assumed that white children more than 
others deserve or derive benefit from better facilities. 
THE ASSUMPTION OF EQUALITY AND 
THE DEFINITIONS OF DISCRIMINATION 
In the context of employment, the assumption of equality is that, as classes, men and women, 
and whites and people of color, are equally able to perform or to learn to perform a job. This 
assumption is crucial to the American law of employment discrimination. The assumption facilitates 
proof of discriminatory conduct against classes of people. The assumption also offers guidance on the 
difficult issue of discrimination in favor of women and people of color. 
American law recognizes two principal definitions of employment discrimination, disparate 
treatment and disparate impact. Except in the small number of cases in which discrimination against 
only one person is alleged, the assumption of equality is a necessary element of the plaintiffs' proof. 
That is to say, a class action alleging disparate treatment or disparate impact depends on the 
assumption of equality. 
Disparate treatment is intentional discrimination. An employer deliberately denies an 
opportunity to a person because of the person's race or sex. In a class action case, disparate treatment 
is proved with statistics. The plaintiffs demonstrate that so few of them have succeeded in winning the 
opportunity (such as hiring or promotion) that the employer's motive to exclude them is revealed. For 
example, in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, a trucking company was accused of 
discrimination against people of color. The company had two kinds of driving jobs, intra-city and inter-
city. The latter were paid better. Statistics showed that, whereas at least nine percent of the company's 
employees were people of color (many of them intra-city drivers), only one person of color had ever 
been an inter-city driver prior to the lawsuit; and many of the company's terminals were located in cities 
wi th substantial minority populations. The Supreme Court held that these statistics established that the 
employer intentionally excluded people of color from intercity driving jobs. 
The assumption of equality was crucial to the Teamsters decision. The assumption was that 
people of color were as interested in and qualified for inter-city driving jobs as whites were. Without the 
assumption, the statistics would have been meaningless. 
Disparate impact is unintentional discrimination. It occurs when an employment practice is, on 
its face, neutral as to race or sex, yet disadvantages proportionally more members of one class than 
another and is not related to job performance. For example, in Griggs v. Duke Power Company, an 
employer hired for certain jobs based on scores on an aptitude test. Thirty-four percent of European-
Americans, but only 12 percent of African-Americans, who took the test passed it. Thus, the test had a 
disproportional adverse effect on a class. Because the test was not job related (it did not predict success 
on the job), the Supreme Court held the employer was guilty of discrimination. 
Once again, the assumption of equality was crucial to the outcome of the case. The assumption 
was that African-Americans who took the test were as qualified as European-Americans who took the 
test. Without the assumption—if we believed, for example, that European-Americans were better 
qualified for the job—the decision would have been unjustified. 
The assumption of equality can be rebutted in a given case. Suppose the job in the Teamsters 
case had been aeronautical engineer instead of truck driver; the employer could have proved that 
almost all of the persons qualified for the job were white. Similarly, the employer in Griggs could have 
proved that the aptitude test was valid, that is, that workers' scores on the test correlated with ratings 
of their performance on the job. Thus, analysis of a case begins with the assumption of equality, but it 
can be falsified. This procedure is consistent wi th the assumption itself. Ability may be distributed 
equally across classes of people, but discrimination has prevented many individuals from developing 
their abilities. 
In this context, the assumption would be undermined if it could be rebutted too easily. For 
example, if the employer in Griggs could have won the case merely by testifying to a good-faith belief 
that the test selected the best qualified applicants, the assumption would have been seriously 
weakened; a judge might begin a trial wi th the assumption that the racial classes are equal, but the 
employer's mere belief that they are not would defeat this assumption. After the Griggs decision, the 
courts consistently held that a practice with a disparate impact was justified only if the practice met the 
standard of business necessity. As a result, the assumption of equality could be overridden only if the 
practice in question was very important to the business. In Wards Cove Packing Company v. Antonio, 
decided 18 years after Griggs, the Supreme Court threatened the assumption by stating a diminished 
standard. The Court held that a practice with a disparate impact is justified if the practice serves, in a 
significant way, the legitimate goals of the business. This standard made it easier to overrride the 
assumption of equality. But Congress speedily corrected the Court. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 
reinstated the business necessity standard and reaffirmed the assumption of equality. 
THE ASSUMPTION OF EQUALITY AND 
NONDISCRIMINATION, AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION, AND REVERSE DISCRIMINATION 
The law of discrimination in favor of women and people of color also reflects the assumption of 
equality. Although the courts do not mention the assumption, I believe it informs their decisions. This 
law can be understood if the issues are divided into three categories: nondiscrimination, affirmative 
action, and reverse discrimination. I shall discuss some issues which the Supreme Court has decided and 
others that may be presented in the future. 
The first category of issues concerns "nondiscrimination." It means awarding opportunities 
wi thout regard to race or sex, or, as a practical matter, awarding opportunities according to relevant 
qualifications. A question at the threshold is whether the laws enforcing nondiscrimination protect 
white men as well as women and people of color. The Supreme Court decided this issue in McDonald v. 
Santa Fe Trail Transportation Company. Two European-Americans and an African-American were 
charged with stealing from their employer; the former were f ired, but the latter was retained. The 
European-Americans sued, claiming they had been discriminated against, and they won. The employer 
argued that the civil rights acts were not intended to protect European-Americans, but the Court 
rejected this argument because the legislative histories of both the nineteenth and twentieth-century 
statutes clearly show that Congress intended to protect people of all colors. 
The outcome of McDonald is fully consistent with the assumption of equality. The assumption 
applies to all classes. To protect some but not others from discrimination would be tantamount to 
labeling the protected classes as weaker and, perhaps, inferior. As applied to the facts of the case, the 
assumption requires us to assume that one class is as likely to steal as another. Evidence that justifies 
the discharge of European-Americans must also justify the discharge of African-Americans. 
Nondiscrimination permits acknowledgment that people of various backgrounds manifest their 
abilities variously. For example, suppose an employer is choosing between two applicants for an entry-
level job in a personnel department. Neither has significant work experience. But whereas one is a 
recent graduate of a college program in industrial relations, the other is a woman who has maintained a 
household and reared a brood of healthy children. The employer could properly recognize that the 
woman's knowledge of and talent for organization and interpersonal relations may be at least as great 
as the student's, and the woman's practical experience might well t ip the scale in her favor. 
People living outside the dominant Euro-American male culture may demonstrate their abilities 
in ways not readily apparent to European-American men. Learning to appreciate nonstandard signs of 
ability is laudable and, far f rom endangering the assumption of equality, reinforces it. 
It is not discriminatory to give weight to an applicant's race or sex when these qualities may 
contribute to performance of the job. For example, a school may take into account national origin in 
hiring a teacher for a course in Native American studies. Although I do not believe that only a Native 
American is qualified to teach such a course, I am willing to accept that an applicant's life experience as 
a Native American can contribute to one's ability to teach the course. Similarly, I can understand that 
children need role models wi th whom to identify and counselors who understand their problems. If a 
faculty has no or very few professors who are women or people of color, sex and color become relevant 
qualifications for job vacancies. 
I recognize the difficulty of knowing the point at which enough women and people of color have 
been hired that sex and color lose their relevance. I believe most of us are far f rom that point, and I am 
sure that white men will alert us as we approach it. 
One may reasonably object to the facts of the preceding examples of nondiscrimination, but 
not, I think, to the principle they are intended to exemplify. One may hold that rearing a family does not 
prepare one for a job in personnel administration, that being a Native American does not contribute to 
teaching Native American studies, or that young persons do not need role models and counselors of 
their sex and color. But one cannot reasonably object that skills can be acquired in varying ways and 
that, if sex or color is genuinely a qualification for a job, an employer may take such qualifications into 
account in the hiring decision. The assumption of equality is not offended as long as decisions are 
grounded on relevant qualifications. 
The second category of issues arises from "affirmative action," which means an attempt to help 
members of disadvantaged classes to meet the standards to which the members of the privileged 
classes are held. Thus, affirmative action includes advertising jobs in media that are directed at 
disadvantaged classes and operating training programs that are targeted primarily—and even 
exclusively—at disadvantaged classes. 
I have no objection to affirmative action because it does not challenge the assumption of 
equality. Indeed, directed advertising and targeted training programs affirm the assumption. It would be 
a waste of t ime to advertise in Spanish unless the readers could do the job. Moreover, affirmative action 
recognizes and attempts to remedy oppression. Men of European provenance have oppressed other 
classes in American society from the colonial days to the present. Efforts to train African-Americans, 
therefore, are compassionate attempts to overcome the handicap under which many African-Americans 
labor. Such efforts affirm the assumption of equality because there would be no point in training people 
unless they had the ability necessary for the job; oppression has prevented them from developing that 
ability, and training compensates (in part) for the oppression. 
The Supreme Court has taken a similar position in three cases. The one that attracted the most 
attention was United Steelworkers of America v. Weber. An employer and a union agreed to establish a 
program to train skilled workers. One criterion for admission to the program was seniority. The other 
criterion was race. The justification for the latter was that African-Americans comprised nearly 40 
percent of the workforce in the community surrounding the plant, but less than 2 percent of skilled 
workers in the plant. Accordingly, the labor management agreement specified that half of the openings 
in the training program would be reserved for African-Americans. A European-American named Weber 
would have qualified for the program if seniority had been the only criterion, but he was excluded 
because of the racial criterion. 
Weber lost his case in the Supreme Court. This outcome is consistent wi th the assumption of 
equality. A training program that is targeted at a disadvantaged group does not assume the group is 
unequal to the privileged group. To the contrary, a targeted program assumes that the disadvantaged 
group can become qualified for the opportunity. If proportionally fewer members of the disadvantaged 
group are presently qualified, the assumption tells us that the reason is oppression, not inability. 
In Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, the Court ruled on whether it is 
discriminatory to favor a woman or person of color in the case of a t ie. An affirmative action plan 
provided that sex could be considered along with several other factors in making promotions to jobs 
from which women had long been excluded. No specific number of jobs was reserved for women, but 
the plan was to endure until their representation approximated the proportion of women in the area 
labor force. Several applicants for a job that no woman had ever held, including a man named Johnson 
and a woman named Joyce, were certified as qualified. Johnson slightly outscored Joyce, but she got the 
job. He sued and lost. 
This result is consistent with the assumption of equality. Sex or race may be used to break a tie 
in selection (Johnson's score of 75 was virtually identical to Joyce's score of 73) because, by hypothesis, 
the choice must be based on irrelevant criteria. An employer who believes that a member of a 
disadvantaged class has probably overcome more obstacles in order to reach the same position as a 
member of a privileged class, or who wishes to use this occasion to achieve a better balanced workforce, 
does not threaten the assumption of equality. Preferring a woman or person of color over an equally 
qualified European- American male bespeaks no belief that the latter is less qualified for the job. 
The third case on affirmative action is Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers v. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, in which a major issue was whether a court may require a defendant to meet a goal of 
minority representation. The defendant was a union that had illegally excluded people of color from 
membership for more than 20 years. As a remedy, the trial court ordered the union to achieve the goal 
that 29 percent of its members be people of color by a certain date; this figure reflected the percentage 
of people of color in the area labor force. The union opposed this remedy. The principal route to 
membership was through an apprenticeship program. As a practical matter, therefore, meeting the goal 
on t ime required the union to give priority to people of color seeking apprenticeships. In this aspect, the 
case resembled Weber, and the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order. 
This decision does no violence to the assumption of equality. An order that a union's 
membership reflect the racial composition of the area labor force assumes equality of ability across 
races. If 29 percent of the workers in the union's jurisdiction are people of color, we may assume that 
people of color are also 29 percent of the workers qualified or qualifiable for the jobs that union 
members hold. 
The third category of issues covers "reverse discrimination," which means conferring an 
opportunity on a person who is not the best qualified applicant because that person belongs to an 
oppressed class. Thus, whereas ordinary discrimination operates against women and people of color (at 
least at the present t ime; the tables may well turn in the future), reverse discrimination operates, or 
seems to operate, in their favor. Neither is acceptable. 
All discrimination violates the assumption of equality. To deny an opportunity to a woman or 
person of color who is the best qualified applicant is to say to that individual, "You are not what you 
seem. Your class is inferior." To award an opportunity to a woman or person of color who is not the best 
qualified applicant is to say to that individual, "Your class is not as good as others. Your people cannot 
make it on your own." 
The effect of reverse discrimination on its "beneficiary" and on others is unhealthy. The t ruth 
will out; both the "beneficiary" and one's co-workers will know how one was hired. Unless one is a 
complete egoist, the "beneficiary" can only construct a self-abasing rationalization, such as, "I would 
have made it on my own but for discrimination" or "This helps make up for centuries of oppression." Co-
workers and superiors are likely to display anger or condescension, neither of which is good for anyone, 
and force the "beneficiary" to rationalize others' hostility by saying, for example, "They are all racists or 
sexists." And there remains the probability of failure. Many highly qualified people fail; few unqualified 
people succeed. Reverse discrimination guarantees that women and people of color will be 
overrepresented in the class of failures. However difficult it is to rationalize being hired via reverse 
discrimination, I suspect it is even harder to rationalize one's failure. But even if one can, no one is 
fooled. Rationalization internalizes the initial discrimination; one becomes evidence to oneself that the 
assumption of equality is false. Because failure cannot be hidden, one becomes evidence to others as 
well. We believe what we witness. A woman or person of color who fails in our presence reinforces 
discriminatory attitudes. In the end, the real victims of reverse discrimination are its "beneficiaries." 
The Supreme Court confronted reverse discrimination in Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. 
Stotts. The case began when African-Americans sued the city fire department for racial discrimination. 
The suit was settled by a consent decree that committed the department to the goal of increasing the 
percentage of African-Americans in the department until it approximated the percentage of African-
Americans in the local labor force. Subsequently, budget problems required layoffs. If the usual seniority 
rules had been fol lowed, the recently hired African-Americans would have been the first to go. But a 
new decree was negotiated, suspending the seniority system when it would reduce the percentage of 
African-Americans in certain jobs. The effect of this decree was that some African-Americans kept their 
jobs at the expense of European- Americans who had greater seniority. The Supreme Court held that the 
decree was illegal. 
The Court's ruling affirms the assumption of equality. The assumption dictates that we assume 
that quality of job performance is equal across classes. In consequence, the assumption would have 
permitted the department to spread the reduction in force proportionally across classes, for example, 
by layoffs at random. But the assumption does not require that layoffs be proportional across classes, 
for the assumption may be overridden for good cause. One good cause is assessments of individual 
ability. If the department had laid off the firefighters wi th the lowest performance evaluations, the 
assumption would not have been offended, regardless of whether more members of one class than 
another were affected. Another good cause is seniority. One may fairly believe that senior workers are 
more experienced and, therefore, more skillful, or that they are more loyal and, therefore, more 
valuable to the operation or deserving of protection. 
The department used two criteria in deciding whom to lay off. Seniority was observed unless it 
would have reduced the representation of African- Americans in a job, in which case proportionality was 
invoked. As they relate to the assumption of equality, these two criteria are inconsistent wi th one 
another. Proportionality implements the assumption; seniority overrides it (albeit legitimately). By using 
inconsistent criteria, the department demonstrated its disregard for the assumption of equality. 
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 outlawed another form of reverse discrimination. An employer who 
uses a test in selection may protect against liability in two ways: use a test that does not have a 
disparate impact, or use a test that validly distinguishes qualified from unqualified applicants. The law 
protects so many classes that almost any test is bound to have a disparate impact on one group or 
another. Yet developing and validating a test, especially one that is valid within and across both sexes 
and several racial classes, is expensive. Caught in this bind, many employers adjusted the results of tests 
so as to eliminate any disparate impact. A common adjustment, know as race norming, was to judge an 
applicant's score on the test, not against all other scores, but only against the scores of applicants of the 
same race; then the employer would hire in proportion to each race's share of the applicant pool. Thus, 
if 25 percent of the applicants were African-Americans, 35 percent were Latino-Americans, and 40 
percent were European-Americans, and if 100 jobs were available, then the employer would hire the 25 
African-Americans, the 35 Latino-Americans, and the 40 European-Americans who scored the highest in 
their respective classes. 
As a practical matter, race norming was indistinguishable from hiring quotas and, therefore, for 
the reasons stated above, violated the assumption of equality. When the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
outlawed race norming, Congress reaffirmed America's commitment to the assumption. 
CONCLUSION 
I wish to preserve the assumption of equality in public life and in employment. I do not wish to 
live in a world in which it is proper to believe that people who appear to be different from oneself are 
inferior. I do not know whether the assumption is in fact correct. I am reasonably certain that we have 
no sound method to verify the assumption, and I hope we will never develop one. Rather, I hope that, in 
a few generations, miscegenation of ethnic and racial classes will homogenize the gene pool to the point 
that we will no longer care, or be able to know, a person's "race;" and I see no benefit in knowing 
whether we were different before we became the same. But I do see harm in weakening the assumption 
of equality. I believe our future as a moral people depends in significant part on maintaining the 
assumption. We have violated it often in our history, and we must endeavor, not only to end 
oppression, but also to compensate for its effects. We must encourage women and people of color to 
pursue goals that have been denied them. We must train them and welcome them when they qualify. 
But we must not allow their cries for justice or our zeal for it—or our desire to f ind an easy, inexpensive 
remedy—to destroy the very ideals we seek to vindicate. 
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